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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Case No: 20170110-CA

JENNIFER ORYALL,
Defendant / Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

****
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
the provisions of Utah Code §78A-4-103(2)(e) as an appeal from a court of record
in a criminal case not involving a first degree or capital felony.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Whether the trial court erred when it denied Oryall's motion to suppress.
"A district court's 'ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed for correctness,
including its application of the law to the facts.' We review the district court's
<tiv

factual findings for clear error. We will only find clear error if the court's factual
findings 'are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination."' State v.

Perea, 2013 UT 68, ,I32 (citing State v. Tripp, 2010 UT 9, ,r 23, 227 P.3d 1251,
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Save Our Schools v. Bd. of Educ., 2005 UT 55, ,I 9, 122 P.3d 611). This issue was
preserved by Oryall's motion to suppress. R.033.
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS

All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in full in the Addenda.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
Defendant, Jennifer Oryall, appeals from the judgment, sentence, and
commitment on one count of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs, a
third degree felony. This appeal stems from the district court's denial of a motion
to suppress evidence obtained in violation of Oryall's right against unreasonable
warrantless search and seizure.
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
On January 28, 2016, Jennifer Oryall was charged by information with one
count of DUI, a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code §41-6a-502, one
count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in violation of
Utah Code §58-37a-5, and one count Driving on Denied License, a class C
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code §53-3-227. R.001-02.
On July 21, 2016 the trial court held a preliminary hearing. R.031, 141. At
the hearing the State called Deputy Roger Lowe who testified about Oryall's
investigation and arrest. The trial court bound the DUI and Denied License
charges over for trial but not the Paraphernalia charge. R.159.

2
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Oryall filed a motion to suppress claiming her traffic stop and detention
violated the Fourth Amendment and Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.
R.033. Oryall asserted that Deputy Lowe's access vehicle registration and driver
license records constituted an illegal search because these records are classified
as protected records under the Utah Government Records Access and
Management Act (GRAMA). R.034.
The State responded to the motion by claiming Oryall lacked standing to
object to the search of these records because they were already in the possession
of the government. R.051-53, 055. According the State, Oryall had failed to
establish a legitimate expectation of privacy. R.54. The State also argued Deputy
Lowe accessed the records in accordance with the GRAMA regulations. R.057-59.
~

In reply, Oryall claimed she had standing because she had a legitimate
expectation of privacy based on the status of those records being classified as
protected. R.060-61. Oryall asserted Deputy Lowe did not comply with GRAMA
when he accessed these records because he had no reasonable articulable
suspicion and thus, no proceeding or investigation was occurring when he
accessed the records. R.062-63.
The trial court found that, despite the GRAMA statute's creation of "a right
of privacy in relation to personal data gathered by governmental entities",
because these records are "obviously needed to allow police to enforce" the
drivers license statute, and because the license plate was not hidden or concealed
from view, this was not a search and access to the protected information was

3
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authorized under the law enforcement exceptions in GRAMA. R.069-71. The
court also found that, if access to the license information was a search, it was
reasonable because public policy supports allowing police to use these records "in
the normal course of their duties" because "privacy interest should be
subordinate to the public safety interests." R.071. The trial court respectfully
denied Oryall's motion to suppress. R.072.
Oryall then entered a conditional no contest plea to DUI, a third degree
felony, reserving the right to appeal the trial court's denial of her motion to
suppress. R.076-86, 120-23.
On February 2, 2017 Oryall was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 0-5
years in prison. R.095. That sentence was suspended and Oryall was placed on
probation for 36 months to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole. R.09596. Oryall was ordered to served 180 days in prison and pay a $1079.00 fine.
R.096.
Gbi

On February 6, 2017, Oryall filed a timely notice of appeal. R.099.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

Preliminary Testimony of Deputy Lowe
Roger Lowe is a police officer working for the Utah County Sheriffs Office.
R.145. Deputy Lowe testified that on December 13, 2015 he was "on SR-198 in
Payson, and [] was just running license plates checks, and her vehicle went by
me. As it went by [he] ran a license plate check on that." R.R.146. Lowe "had just
seen the vehicle driving and [he] ran the license plate." R.156. Lowe was not

4
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looking for Oryall "as part of any investigation or anything", instead he was "just
running license plates checks", something that was not "unusual for [him] to do".
R.147, 146. Lowe's search of the license plate records revealed that Oryall was a

"known driver of the vehicle". R.146, 156. Lowe doesn't recall whether Oryall was
shown as the registered owner, only that the search reported Oryall was shown as
a known driver of the vehicle, meaning there was some connection in the
database between her name and the vehicle registered by the plate he checked.
R.156.

Then, after having learned Orayll's name, Lowe searched for Oryall's
driver's license information in the DLD records. This search revealed that Oryall's
driver's license was "known to be denied." R.146. Lowe continued to watch the
vehicle as it stopped at a corner market and the officer observed Oryall exit the
vehicle. R.147. "During that time [Lowe] was trying to confirm if in fact her
driver's license was denied." R.147.
Oryall returned to her vehicle and drove away. R.148. Lowe did not observe
any traffic violations or patterns indicating impairment. R.148, 157. Shortly
thereafter, Lowe performed a traffic stop, by initiating in his lights and pulling
behind Oryall where she had made another stop at a restaurant. R.148-49. After
making contact with Oryall, Low observed "several signs of use, drug use" so he
asked her to exit the vehicle and conduct field sobriety tests and requested a
canine unit to respond to the scene. R.149-50. Lowe concluded that Oryall "was
under the influence" and "wasn't able to safely operate a vehicle." R.155.

5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

District Court's Relevant Findings of Fact

"On December 13,2015, Officer Roger Lowe was parked at the side of the
road. While there, he randomly observed license plates on passing vehicles and
'ran' the numbers against the state license plate database." R.066. "The
Defendant, Ms. Oryall, drove by and Officer Lowe noted her plate numbers.
When he ran a check of the license plate he found that Ms. Oryall was a known
driver of that vehicle. Upon further checking, he was informed that her driving
license was 'denied."' R.066. "With that information he initiated a traffic stop."
R.066.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The district court erred when it denied Oryall's motion to suppress where
she had an expectation of privacy in the personal data collected by the
government and the police accessed and searched that data without cause. This
was a violation of Oryall's constitutional right to be secure against unreasonable
and warrantless searches. The evidence obtained during that violation, and the
fruit thereof, should be excluded as a necessary consequence of police violations
of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, and Amendment IV to the
Constitution of the United States.

6
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED ORYALL'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
It is the trial court's position, that "when an officer charged with enforcing

driver registration and insurance laws compares that readily observed license
plate number to a database maintained for the very purpose of keeping track of
which vehicles are licensed and insured he has not engaged in a 'search' for the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment." R.070. "Even if the license check is
considered a search, it is the view of [the trial court] that the search was
reasonable" because of the public policy in "safe roadways where only properly
licensed and insured drivers operate vehicles." R.071. The trial court ruled that
when the privacy interests conflict with the interest of the safety of the highways,
"the privacy interests should be subordinate to the public safety interests." R.071.
According to the trial court, keeping protected information from the police,
except in instances where an investigation is under way, "would significantly
hamper enforcement of the Uniform Driver License Act". R.071-72. The trial
court denied the motion to suppress because, according to the court, the
legislature would not have intended such "an unreasonably restrictive, indeed []
harmful public policy." R.072.

A. The right to security from warrantless and unreasonable
search and seizure
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no

7
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warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized." UTAH CONST. ART. I, SECT. 14 (see also UNITED STATES CONST., AMEND.
IV). Both the state and federal constitutions protect the people of Utah from
unreasonable searches unto areas of their lives for which they have a legitimate
expectation of privacy. The scope of that protection in Utah is determined by
what a person reasonably expects to be private. See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d

~

460, 469 (Utah 1990) ("the concept of expectation of privacy as a suitable

threshold criterion for determining whether article I, section 14 is applicable.").
In Utah, this is true even with information held by third parties, like bank
records (see State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991)), and Oryall
asserts it is true with personal data collected by the government. Just like
opening a bank account, "it is virtually impossible to participate in ...
contemporary society without" paying taxes, registering motor vehicles, obtaining
drivers licenses or other ID cards, registering to vote, and countless other

~

activities that expose private information to the government. Thompson, 810
P.2d 415, 418. The government's collection and storage of our private data, even
when voluntarily provided, "is not entirely volitional and should not be seen as
conduct which constitutes a waiver of an expectation of privacy." Id. People do
not waive the constitutional right of privacy, the right to prevent the police from

~

accessing countless intimate details about our lives, just by interacting with the
government in countless unavoidable ways. People do not abandon the right to

8
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keep private information about income private just because the government
collects and stores data for taxes. And like the Utah Supreme Court recognized in

Thompson, just because a third party (an agency in the government) has access to
private information, that does not mean the information is not private, it does not
mean the government can then refuse to keep it private, and use and share it for
any reason it sees fit.
Oryall asserts that she maintained a right to privacy in the protected motor
vehicle title and registration records even though the DMV had collected and
stored it. Orayll asserts that she maintained a right to privacy in the protected
driving record even though it was collected and kept by the DLD. Because Orayll
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in this information, her right to security
in that information was protected by the Utah Constitution against unreasonable
searches. She was protected by the Utah Constitution that her information would
not be accessed unless a warrant supported by probable cause had been issued.
Oryall urges the Court to hold, as the Utah Supreme Court did in

Thompson, "that under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, defendants
under the facts of this case had the right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures of' the personal data gathered and stored by government
entities. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418. Oryall asserts that it is reasonable for our
citizens to expect the personal data compiled by the government, like the records
compiled and created by banks, will be protected from disclosure because that
data reveals many aspects of our personal affairs, opinions, habits, associations,

9
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and political and religious preferences. See Thompson, 418 (citing Burrows v.

Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1974)).
B. GRAMA

This reasonable expectation of privacy in data collected and stored by the

~

government is supported by the legislature's enactment of the Government
Records Access and Management Act, or GRAMA. In its ruling, the trial court
characterized the legislature's conduct in enacting GRAMA as being motivated by
an "intent to create '[a] right of privacy in relation to personal data gathered by
governmental entities."' R.069 (emphasis added) (citing

UTAH

CODE § 63G-24ilJ

102). According to the trial court, because the legislature was creating the right of
privacy, it could also create exceptions to the right, allowing the government to
"share protected records in order to enforce, litigate, or investigate criminal
activity when the record is necessary to a proceeding or investigation." R.067.
Then, having found the legislature could limit the right of privacy, the trial court,
reading the language of the GRAMA statute, found that the legislature authorized
"government prosecutor[s], peace officer[s], or auditor[s]" access to "records that
may evidence or relate to a violation of law". R.067 (citing

UTAH

CODE §63G-2-

206(9)). It was this statutory exception, according to the trial court, which
allowed the police to access the protected DMVand DLD records.
But the trial court was imprecise about the language of the GRAMA intent
statute and its conclusion about what the legislature was doing when it enacted
GRAMA in an important way. That imprecision was important in justifying the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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trial court's incorrect ruling, and should be important to this Court in deciding
the scope of the public's expectation of privacy in our data collected by the
government.
({,I

Section 102 does describe the legislature's intent in enacting GRAMA, but
the explicit language used by the legislature was not an intent to create of a right
of privacy, but the recognition of a constitutional right to privacy, a right that
already existed by virtue of the Utah constitution. "In enacting this act, the
Legislature recognizes two constitutional rights: (a) the public's right of access to
information concerning the conduct of the public's business; and (2) the right of
privacy in relation to personal data gathered by governmental entities." UTAH
CODE § 63G-2-102(1).
By enacting GRAMA the legislature recognized that the people of Utah
have the constitutional right of privacy in the "personal data gathered by
governmental entities", and it intended to "prevent abuse of confidentiality by
governmental entities ... " UTAH CODE § 63G-2-102(3). Thus, the right of privacy
discussed in section 102 is not a right created and circumscribed by the language
of the GRAMA statute. Instead, privacy is a right enshrined in the constitution
and protected by the limits the constitution places upon the government. In other
words, the legislature was recognizing that the people of Utah had a legitimate
expectation that the government will keep private the personal data it gathers, as
required by the constitution.

11
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The legislature then crafted GRAMA to try to control the conduct of the
government considering these constitutional rights. See, e.g., Am. Bush v. City of
S. Salt Lake,

2006

lIT

40, ,I

77,

140 P.3d 1235 (J.

Durrant, concur) ("[T]he

legislative branch is the branch of government that is expressly designed to adjust
our legal framework to reflect contemporary context."). However, even the will of
the people-as represented in the legislative bodies and the laws they passremains subject to the protections guaranteed by the constitution. Id. ("If it so
happens that the prevailing view of society toward a certain behavior has altered
over time, society is fully empowered to implement that view through the use of
the democratic process.

Of course, the will of the majority is checked by

established constitutional protections. Our role as judges is to identify and fortify
the wall protecting those rights specified in the constitution from majoritarian
override.").
So, unlike the trial court's conclusion that the legislature was creating a
right that it could limit however it wanted, the language of section

102

clearly

demonstrates the legislature was passing GRAMA because it recognized people's
already existing constitutional "right of privacy in relation to personal data
gathered by governmental entities", like the DMV and the DLD, and wanted to
make sure government agencies did not act unconstitutionally with respect to
that private data.

UTAH CODE§ 63G-2-102.

So, to the extent that the trial court's

~

decision was based on the idea that the legislature created and limited the right of
privacy, the trial court was incorrect.

12
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To the extent that the trial court's decision was based on the idea that the
legislature limited or created exceptions to the right of privacy recognized in
GRAMA, the trial court was incorrect again. The legislature, by passing the
GRAMA statute, could no sooner limit or create exceptions to the rights
contained within article I section 14 than it could retract a defendant's rights to
counsel, to confront witnesses, to compulsory process, to trial by impartial jury,
etc. See UTAH CONST., ART. I, SECT. 12. These constitutional rights are
fundamental and cannot be amended or limited unless and until the
constitutional itself is amended.

C. This was an unreasonable and warrantless search
Having established that the legislature, Utah's democratically elected
representatives, have recognized a constitutional "right of privacy in relation to
personal data gathered by governmental entities", including the data contained
within the DMV and DLD databases searched by Deputy Lowe, and that article I
section 14 applies to this data, the next question is whether the searches in this
case were reasonable or authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause as
required by the constitution. Oryall asserts that they were not and that, due to the
violation of section 14, evidence obtained by that violation, and its fruit, must be
suppressed.
Traditionally, in order to justify a search of constitutionally protected areas
the government must show there was a warrant or some exigency which would
make the search reasonable under the constitution. See State v. Rigby,

13
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2016

UT

App 42, ,rs, (Law enforcement "generally need a warrant to search a place in
which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy", however, "there are, of
course, exceptions." (other citations omitted)).
Oryall asserts that in this case, no such facts exist to justify the warrantless
invasion of her privacy at the time the DMV and DLD databases searched by
Deputy Lowe. Oryall was not under investigation at the time the databases were
accessed by police. In fact, nobody was under investigation at that time. Lowe
was simply running records checks on random vehicles. Moreover, Deputy Lowe
learned nothing suspicious when he first accessed the DMV record and learned
that Oryall was a known driver of the vehicle in question. Only when he further
violated her right to privacy in her government held records did he learn she had
a suspended license. However, he had nothing to indicate that she was even
driving. the -vehicle at this time. In addition, he observed no traffic violations nor __
any behavior while he observed her in the store and parking lot that would give
provide probable cause or even reasonable suspicion. He initiated the traffic stop
based only on database information that a "Jennifer Oryall" was a "known" driver
of the car in question and that her license was "denied". He did not know her.
He observed no violation of the law. And above all, he had no reasonable basis
for violating her constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy in accessing the
DMV and DLD databases without a warrant or any other exception which would
justify (i.e. make reasonable) the search of her protected records.

14
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Ci

Furthermore, all of the evidence resulting from the stop-including the
searches and all testing-was derived from these database searches. Therefore,
since those database inquiries were constutionally impermissible, all subsequent
evidence must be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree. See, Thompson, 810
P.2d 415, 418 (citing State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990), State v.

Bolt, 689 P.2d 519, 524 (Ariz. 1984)) ("Exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is
a necessary consequence of police violations of article I, section 14.").

~

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT

Oryall asks that this court reverse the trial court's denial of her motion to
suppress, and remand this matter to the trial court with instructions that she be
allowed to withdraw her plea.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28 th day of July, 2017.

Isl D. Thompson & M. Lindsay
Appointed Appellate Counsel
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(f)

I certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Rule
24(t) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The total word count of this brief
is 4039. It was prepared in Microsoft Word.

Isl D. Thompson & M. Lindsay

15

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I emailed a copy of the foregoing brief and mailed two paper
copies, postage prepaid, to the Utah State Attorney General, Appeals Division,
criminalappeals@agutah.gov, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
on this 28 th day of July, 2017.

Isl D. Thompson & M. Lindsay
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FILED
OCT I 3 2016
4TH DISTRICT

STATE OF UTAH

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT YT4'HQQl:dNTY
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UT AH

t

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Ruling on Motion to Suppress
Date: October 12, 2016

VS.

Case No.: 161400218

JENNIFER ORYALL,
Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor
Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on the Defendant's motion to suppress. The matter
has been briefed and submitted to the Court for decision. For the reasons discussed below, the
~

motion to suppress is denied.
On December 13, 2015, Officer Roger Lowe was parked at the side of the road. While
there, he randomly observed license plates on passing vehicles and "ran" the numbers against the
state license plate database. Preliminary Hearing, 10:32:00-10:33:00, Jul. 21, 2016. The
Defendant, Ms. Oryall, drove by and Officer Lowe noted her plate numbers. When he ran a
check of the license plate he found that Ms. Oryall was a known driver of that vehicle. Upon
further checking, he was informed that her driving license was "denied." With that information
he initiated a traffic stop. Information, I, Jan. 28, 2016. As he spoke to Ms. Oryall, Officer
Lowe saw what he felt were signs of drug use including impaired speech, tremors, and
constricted pupils. Id. He then required her to perform field sobriety tests. Officer Lowe
concluded that Ms. Oryall was unable to safely operate a motor vehicle. She was arrested and
her car was searched. During the search, officers found drug paraphernalia. Blood was drawn
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from Ms. Oryall. Later testing of the blood suggested that she had ingested a number of
controlled substances.
Ms. Oryall argues that all of the evidence resulting from the stop, the searches, and the
blood testing was derived from the initial license plate inquiry. Counsel argues that the inquiry
was improper and that all the rest must be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Silverthorne Lumber Co. y United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182 (1920), Wong Sun v
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963).
Utah Code Ann. § 630-2-101 et seq. (hereafter "GRAMA") imposes restrictions on the
ability ofgovernment agencies to share records which are classified as "private," "controlled," or
"protected." UCA § 63G-2-206(l)(b).
License plate and driver's license records accessed in this case by Officer Lowe are
classified as "protected" records under GRAMA. UCA § 53-3-109(l)(a); UCA § 41-la-116(3);
Utah Admin. Code R708-36-l. Under the statute, Government agencies are allowed to share
protected records in order to enforce, litigate, or investigate criminal activity when the record is
necessary to a proceeding or investigation. Id. Additionally, "[r]ecords that may evidence or
relate to a violation of law may be disclosed to a government prosecutor, peace officer, or
auditor." UCA § 630-2-206(9). Indeed it occurs to this Court that the primary purpose for
maintaining an index of valid and invalid license plates and driver licenses is to assist law
enforcement efforts to ensure that all vehicles and drivers are properly licensed and insured.
Plainly, when an investigation of a driver has been commenced independently and
officers determine that relevant evidence might be in the records, those records may be shared
upon request. It has long been established that a routine computer check of license and
Page 2 of 7
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registration is a normal and expected part of any level two traffic detention. State v Lopez, 873
P.2d 1127 (Utah, 1994). The question presented here is whether these same records might be
"cold searched" to determine the status of a randomly observed license plate number and the
status of a driver associated with that license plate. This Court was unable to find Utah appellate
precedent which has considered the implications of the privacy interests defined in the GRAMA
statute as contrasted with a need to share information with law enforcement for public safety.
Counsel for Ms. Oryall argues that the license check was a random search, not supported by
reasonable suspicion, and that the information gained as a result of the license check should be
suppressed as a violation of ORAMA. As discussed below, this Court disagrees.
DISCUSSION
Ms. Oryall argues that Officer Lowe violated her right to be protected from unreasonable
searches and seizures under the U.S. and Utah constitutions when he accessed her motor vehicle
records through a random license plate check. Motion to Suppress, 2-3, Aug. 17, 2016. A traffic
stop is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if the officer had a reasonable articulable
suspicion at the time of the stop. State v. Simons, 296 P Jd 72 l, 726-31 (Utah 2013). In other
states, courts have repeatedly held that a random motor vehicle records check does not constitute
a search for the purposes of the search and seizure analysis, but can actually provide reasonable
suspicion necessary to justify a level two investigatory stop. See, e.g., Village of Lake in the
Hills v. Lloyd 227 Ill.App.3d 351, 169 Ill. Dec. 351,591 N.E.2d 524 (1992); State v.

~

Ritter. 80.1 N.E.2d 689 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); State v. Mills. 458 N. W.2d 395, 396-97 (Iowa
Ct.App.1990); People v. Jones. 260 Mich. App. 424,678 N.W.2d 627 (2004); State v.
Page3 of7

0068
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

State of Utah v. Jennifer Oryall, Case No. 161400218, Ruling on Motion to Supress

Pike. 551 N.W.2d 919 (Minn.1996); State v. Richter. 145 N.H. 640, 765 A.2d 687
(2000); State v. Panko. 101 Or. App. 6, 788 P.2d 1026 (1990). In Village Lake in the Hills v.
Lloyd, the court held that "the information that the vehicle's owner had a revoked driver's license
provided the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop defendant's vehicle for the purpose of
ascertaining the status of the license of the driver." Village of Lake in the Hills v. Lloyd 591
~

N.E.2d 524, 525 (1992). Similarly, in the present case, the access of Officer Lowe to the
vehicle and driver license records provided reasonable suspicion that Ms. Oryall was driving
unlawfully. Upon initiating a lawful stop based upon that suspicion, Officer Lowe could
properly investigate other matters, such as drug use and impaired driving, ifhe developed the
required reasonable suspicion during the course of the stop. State v. Simons, 296 P .3d 721, 726-

3 I (Utah 2013).
The claim of Ms. Oryall that a random license plate check is a Fourth Amendment search
is supported by the ORAMA statute, which explicitly describes a legislative intent to create "[a]
right of privacy in relation to personal data gathered by governmental entities." UCA § 630-2102. However, the statute also includes exceptions where law enforcement agencies may
regularly access protected records in order to "enforce[], litigate[], or investigate[] ... and the
record is necessary to a proceeding or investigation." UCA § 63O-2-206(l)(b). ORAMA
provides that "[r]ecords that may evidence or relate to a violation oflaw may be disclosed to a
government prosecutor, peace officer, or auditor." UCA.§ 630-2-206(9). With these exceptions
in place, Ms. Oryall had a diminished expectation of privacy in those records. The records are
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obviously needed to allow police to enforce the statute, which in this case requires that everyone
who operates a motor vehicle be properly licensed. UCA § 53-3-202.
The concept of a "search" under the Fourth Amendment implies access to things that are
hidden, concealed, or to which law enforcement would not expect to have ready access. In a
similar case the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held,
Ci;)

"In no way can the visual inspection of a license plate mounted in public view on
the front or rear of a vehicle be considered 'prying into hidden places for that
which is concealed.' Nor can the officer's subsequent check of associated motor
vehicle licenses and records, when 'the state is the very body that issues, controls,
and regulates" such licenses and records."'
State v. Richter, 145 N.H. 640,641, 765 A.2d 687, 688 (2000) referring to State v. Bjerke, 697
A.2d 1069, 1073 (R.I.1997). The license plate in this case was, as required by UCA § 41-la-

404, in plain view. Background information for that plate was in no way hidden or concealed. It
is the view of this Court that when an officer charged with enforcing driver registration and
insurance laws compares that readily observed license plate number to a database maintained for
the very purpose of keeping track of which vehicles are licensed and insured he has not engaged
in a "search" for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The suspicion that Ms. Oryall was
unlawfully driving reasonably supported a level two traffic detention.
In addition to the law enforcement exceptions within ORAMA for the use of protected
records, there are other state and federal statutory regimes that specifically contemplate the use
of motor vehicle information and driver records for law enforcement purposes. The Uniform
Driver License Act provides that access to personal identifying information can only be provided
(1) subject to the exceptions for protected records as found in ORAMA, (2) when the division
determines it is in the interest of the public safety to disclose the information, and (3) in
Page 5 of 7
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accordance with the federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. Chapter 123
(hereafter"DPPA"). UCA § 53-3-109 The DPPA generally prohibits disclosure of driver's
personal information, subject to several exceptions. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a). The exceptions
relevant to this case provide:
Personal information [information that identifies an individual] ... shall be
disclosed for use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and
theft, motor vehicle emissions, motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or
advisories, performance monitoring of motor vehicles and dealers by motor
vehicle manufacturers, and removal of non- owner records from the original
owner records of motor vehicle manufacturers ...
18 U.S.C.A. § 272l(b); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 2725(3). The DPPA also permits disclosure of
'highly r~stricted personal information,' 18 U.S.C.A. § 2725(3) (including photograph, social
security number, and medical or disability information), "[f]or use by any government agency,
including any court or law enforcement agency, in carrying out its functions." 18 U.S.C.A. §
2721(b)(l).
Even if the license check is considered to be a search, it is the view of this Court that the
search w~ reasonable. There is a public policy argument which would allow the use of these
records by law enforcement officers in the normal course of their duties. GRAMA explicitly
protects privacy and personal information of Utah residents; however, the Uniform Driver Act
also describes an important public safety interest in safe roadways where only properly licensed
and insured drivers operate vehicles. UCA § 630-2-102; UCA § 53-3-227. The law
enforcement exceptions included in GRAMA suggest to this Court that when these two
interests-privacy of the citizens and safety of the highways-conflict, the privacy interest
should be subordinate to the public safety interests. Restriction of law enforcement access to
Page 6 of 7
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driver license records and license plate information unless an investigation has already
commenced based upon independent suspicion would significantly hamper enforcement of the
Unifonn Driver License Act. This Court concludes that such a result was not intended by the

<ii

legislature and would result in an unreasonably restrictive, indeed a harmful public policy.
The motion to suppress is, respectfully, denied.

~

Copies of this Ruling mailed to:
Attorney for Prosecution

RANDY KENNARD
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606

~

Attorney for Defendant
DUSTIN PARMLEY
51 South University Avenue Suite 206
Provo, Utah 84601
Mailed this

Jj_ day of October, 2016, postage pre-paid as noted above.
<kiil
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This matter comes before the Court on the Defendant's motion to suppress. The matter
has been briefed and submitted to the Court for decision. For the reasons discussed below, the
motion to suppress is denied.
On December 13, 2015, Officer Roger Lowe was parked at the side of the road. While
there, he randomly observed license plates on passing vehicles and "ran" the numbers against the
state license plate database. Preliminary Hearing, 10:32:00-10:33:00, Jul. 21, 2016. The
Defendant, Ms. Oryall, drove by and Officer Lowe noted her plate numbers. When he ran a
check of the license plate he found that Ms. Oryall was a known driver of that vehicle. Upon
further checking, he was informed that her driving license was "denied." With that information
he initiated a traffic stop. Information, 1, Jan. 28, 2016. As he spoke to Ms. Oryall, Officer
Lowe saw what he felt were signs of drug use including impaired speech, tremors, and
constricted pupils. Id. He then required her to perform field sobriety tests. Officer Lowe
concluded that Ms. Oryall was unable to safely operate a motor vehicle. She was arrested and
her car was searched. During the search, officers found drug paraphernalia. Blood was drawn
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from Ms. Oryall. Later testing of the blood suggested that she had ingested a number of
controlled substances.
Ms. Oryall argues that all of the evidence resulting from the stop, the searches, and the
blood testing was derived from the initial license plate inquiry. Counsel argues that the inquiry
was improper and that all the rest must be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182 (1920), Wong Sun v
United States. 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963).
Utah Code Ann. § 630-2-101 et seq. (hereafter "ORAMA") imposes restrictions on the
ability of.government agencies to share records which are classified as "private," "controlled," or
"protected." UCA § 63G-2-206(1)(b).
License plate and driver's license records accessed in this case by Officer Lowe are
classified as "protected" records under ORAMA. UCA § 53-3-109(l)(a); UCA § 41-la-116(3);
Utah Admin. Code R 708-36-1. Under the statute, Government agencies are allowed to share
protected records in order to enforce, litigate, or investigate criminal activity when the record is
necessary to a proceeding or investigation. Id. Additionally, "[r]ecords that may evidence or
relate to a violation oflaw may be disclosed to a government prosecutor, peace officer, or
auditor." UCA § 630-2-206(9). Indeed it occurs to this Court that the primary purpose for
maintaining an index of valid and invalid license plates and driver licenses is to assist law
enforcement efforts to ensure that all vehicles and drivers are properly licensed and insured.
Plainly, when an investigation of a driver has been commenced independently and
officers determine that relevant evidence might be in the records, those records may be shared
upon request. It has long been established that a routine computer check of license and
Page 2 of 7
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registration is a normal and expected part of any level two traffic detention. State v Lopez, 873
P.2d 1127 (Utah, 1994). The question presented here is whether these same records might be
"cold searched" to determine the status of a randomly observed license plate number and the
status of a driver associated with that license plate. This Court was unable to find Utah appellate
precedent which has considered the implications of the privacy interests defined in the GRAMA
statute as contrasted with a need to share information with law enforcement for public safety.
Counsel for Ms. Oryall argues that the license check was a random search, not supported by
reasonable suspicion, and that the information gained as a result of the license check should be
suppressed as a violation of GRAMA. As discussed below, this Court disagrees.
DISCUSSION
Ms. Oryall argues that Officer Lowe violated her right to be protected from unreasonable
searches and seizures under the U.S. and Utah constitutions when he accessed her motor vehicle
records through a random license plate check. Motion to Suppress, 2-3, Aug. 17, 2016. A traffic
stop is pennissible under the Fourth Amendment if the officer had a reasonable articulable
suspicion at the time of the stop. State v. Simons, 296 P.3d 721, 726--31 (Utah 2013). In other
states, courts have repeatedly held that a random motor vehicle records check does not constitute
a search for the purposes of the search and seizure analysis, but can actually provide reasonable
suspicion necessary to justify a level two investigatory stop. See, e.g., Village of Lake in the
Hills v. Lloyd 227 Ill.App.3d 351, 169 Ill. Dec. 351,591 N.E.2d 524 (1992); State v.
Ritter, 801 N.E.2d 689 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); State v. Mills. 458 N.W.2d 395, 396-97 (Iowa
Ct.App.1990); People v. Jones. 260 Mich. App. 424,678 N.W.2d 627 (2004); State v.
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Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919 (Minn.1996); State v. Richter. 145 N.H. 640, 765 A.2d 687
(2000); State v. Panko, 10 I Or. App. 6, 788 P.2d 1026 ( 1990). In Village Lake in the Hills v.
Lloyd, the court held that "the information that the vehicle's owner had a revoked driver's license
provided the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop defendant's vehicle for the purpose of
ascertaining the status of the license of the driver." Village of Lake in the Hills v. Lloyd 591

N.E.2d 524, 525 (1992). Similarly, in the present case, the access of Officer Lowe to the
vehicle and driver license records provided reasonable suspicion that Ms. Oryall was driving
unlawfully. Upon initiating a lawful stop based upon that suspicion, Officer Lowe could
properly investigate other matters, such as drug use and impaired driving, if he developed the
required reasonable suspicion during the course of the stop. State v. Simons, 296 P .3d 721, 72631 (Utah 2013).
The claim of Ms. Oryall that a random license plate check is a Fourth Amendment search
is supported by the GRAMA statute, which explicitly describes a legislative intent to create "[a]
right of privacy in relation to personal data gathered by governmental entities." UCA § 63G-2102. However, the statute also includes exceptions where law enforcement agencies may
regularly access protected records in order to "enforce□, litigate[], or investigate[] ... and the
record is necessary to a proceeding or investigation." UCA § 63G-2-206(1)(b). GRAMA
provides that "(r]ecords that may evidence or relate to a violation of law may be disclosed to a
government prosecutor, peace officer, or auditor." UCA.§ 630-2-206(9). With these exceptions
in place, Ms. Oryall had a diminished expectation of privacy in those records. The records are

~
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obviously needed to allow police to enforce the statute, which in this case requires that everyone
who operates a motor vehicle be properly licensed. UCA § 53-3-202.
The concept of a "search" under the Fourth Amendment implies access to things that are
hidden, concealed, or to which law enforcement would not expect to have ready access. In a
similar case the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held,

"In no way can the visual inspection of a license plate mounted in public view on
the front or rear of a vehicle be considered 'prying into hidden places for that
which is concealed.' Nor can the officer's subsequent check of associated motor
vehicle licenses and records, when 'the state is the very body that issues, controls,
and regulates" such licenses and records.'"
State v. Richter, 145 N.H. 640, 641, 765 A.2d 687, 688 (2000) referring to State v. Bjerke. 697
A.2d 1069, 1073 (R.1.1997). The license plate in this case was, as required by UCA § 41-la404, in plain view. Background information for that plate was in no way hidden or concealed. It
is the view of this Court that when an officer charged with enforcing driver registration and
insurance laws compares that readily observed license plate number to a database maintained for
the very purpose of keeping track of which vehicles are licensed and insured he has not engaged
in a "search" for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The suspicion that Ms. Oryall was
unlawfully driving reasonably supported a level two traffic detention.
In addition to the law enforcement exceptions within GRAMA for the use of protected
records, there are other state and federal statutory regimes that specifically contemplate the use
of motor vehicle information and driver records for law enforcement purposes. The Uniform
Driver License Act provides that access to personal identifying information can only be provided
(1) subject to the exceptions for protected records as found in GRAMA, (2) when the division
determines it is in the interest of the public safety to disclose the information, and (3) in
Page 5 of 7
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accordance with the federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. Chapter 123
(hereafter "DPPA"). UCA § 53-3-109 The DPPA generally prohibits disclosure of driver's
personal information, subject to several exceptions. 18 U.S.C. § 272l(a). The exceptions
relevant to this case provide:
Personal information [information that identifies an individual] ... shall be
disclosed for use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and
theft, motor vehicle emissions, motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or
advisories, performance monitoring of motor vehicles and dealers by motor
vehicle manufacturers, and removal of non- owner records from the original
owner records of motor vehicle manufacturers ...
18 U.S.C.A. § 272l(b); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 2725(3). The DPPA also permits disclosure of
'highly restricted personal information,' 18 U.S.C.A. § 2725(3) (including photograph, social
security number, and medical or disability information), "[t]or use by any government agency,
including any court or law enforcement agency, in carrying out its functions." 18 U.S.C.A. §
272l(b)(l).
Even if the license check is considered to be a search, it is the view of this Court that the
search w~ reasonable. There is a public policy argument which would allow the use of these
records by law enforcement officers in the normal course of their duties. GRAMA explicitly
protects privacy and personal information of Utah residents; however, the Uniform Driver Act
also describes an important public safety interest in safe roadways where only properly licensed
and insured drivers operate vehicles. UCA § 63G-2-102; UCA § 53-3-227. The law
enforcement exceptions included in GRAMA suggest to this Court that when these two
interests-privacy of the citizens and safety of the highways-conflict, the privacy interest
should be subordinate to the public safety interests. Restriction of law enforcement access to
Page 6 of 7
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driver license records and license plate information unless an investigation has already
commenced based upon independent suspicion would significantly hamper enforcement of the
Uniform Driver License Act. This Court concludes that such a result was not intended by the
legislature and would result in an unreasonably restrictive, indeed a harmful public policy.
The motion to suppress is, respectfully, denied.

Copies of this Ruling mailed to:
Attorney for Prosecution

RANDY KENNARD
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
Attorney for Defendant
DUSTIN PARMLEY
51 South University Avenue Suite 206
Provo, Utah 84601
Mailed this

_/j_ day of October, 2016, postage pre-paid as noted above.
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Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-2-102
Statutes current through the 2017 General Session

Utah Code Annotated > Title 63G General Government > Chapter 2 Government Records
Access and Management Act > Part 1 General Provisions

63G-2-102. Legislative intent.
(1) In enacting this act, the Legislature recognizes two constitutional rights:
(a) the public's right of access to information concerning the conduct of the public's business; and
(b) the right of privacy in relation to personal data gathered by governmental entities.
(2) The Legislature also recognizes a public policy interest in allowing a government to restrict access to
certain records, as specified in this chapter, for the public good.
(3) It is the intent of the Legislature to:
(a) promote the public's right of easy and reasonable access to unrestricted public records;

(b) specify those conditions under which the public interest in allowing restrictions on access to records
may outweigh the public's interest in access;
(c) prevent abuse of confidentiality by governmental entities by permitting confidential treatment of records
only as provided in this chapter;

(d) provide guidelines for both disclosure and restrictions on access to government records, which are
based on the equitable weighing of the pertinent interests and which are consistent with nationwide
standards of information practices;
(e) favor public access when, in the application of this act, countervailing interests are of equal weight; and
(f)

establish fair and reasonable records management practices.

History
C. 1953, 63-2-102, enacted by L. 1991, ch. 259, § 9; 1992, ch. 280, § 14; renumbered by L. 2008, ch. 382, §
1314.
Utah Code Annotated
Copyright© 2017 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
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Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-206
(j)
Statutes current through the 2017 General Session

Utah Code Annotated > Title 63G General Government > Chapter 2 Government Records
Access and Management Act > Part 2 Access to Records

63G-2-206. Sharing records.
(1) A governmental entity may provide a record that is private, controlled, or protected to another
governmental entity, a government-managed corporation, a political subdivision, the federal government,
or another state if the requesting entity:
(a) serves as a repository or archives for purposes of historical preservation, administrative maintenance,
or destruction;
(b) enforces, litigates, or investigates civil, criminal, or administrative law, and the record is necessary to a
proceeding or investigation;

G0

(c) is authorized by state statute to conduct an audit and the record is needed for that purpose;
(d) is one that collects information for presentence, probationary, or parole purposes; or
(e)
(i)

~

is:

(A) the Legislature;
(8) a legislative committee;

(C) a member of the Legislature; or

(D) a legislative staff member acting at the request of the Legislature, a legislative committee, or a

Gw

member of the Legislature; and

(ii) requests the record in relation to the Legislature's duties including:

(A) the preparation or review of a legislative proposal or legislation;
(B) appropriations; or
(C) an investigation or review conducted by the Legislature or a legislative committee.
(2)
(a) A governmental entity may provide a private, controlled, or protected record or record series to another
governmental entity, a political subdivision, a government-managed corporation, the federal
government, or another state if the requesting entity provides written assurance:

(i)

that the record or record series is necessary to the performance of the governmental entity's duties
and functions;

(ii) that the record or record series will be used for a purpose similar to the purpose for which the
information in the record or record series was collected or obtained; and
(iii) that the use of the record or record series produces a public benefit that is greater than or equal to
the individual privacy right that protects the record or record series.

~
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(b) A governmental entity may pmvide a piivate, contm!led, Oi pmtected iecoid Oi iecoid seiies to a
contractor or a private provider according to the requirements of Subsection (6)(b).

(3)
(a) A governmental entity shall provide a private, controlled, or protected record to another governmental
entity, a political subdivision, a government-managed corporation, the federal government, or another
state if the requesting entity:

(i)

is entitled by law to inspect the record;

(ii) is required to inspect the record as a condition of participating in a state or federal program or for
receiving state or federal funds; or

(iii) is an entity described in Subsection (1 )(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e).

(b) Subsection (3)(a)(iii) applies only if the record is a record described in Subsection 63G-2-305(4).
(4) Before disclosing a record or record series under this section to another governmental entity, another state,
the United States, a foreign government, or to a contractor or private provider, the originating governmental
entity shall:
(a) inform the recipient of the record's classification and the accompanying restrictions on access; and
{b} if the recipient is not a governmental entity to which this chapter applies, obtain the recipient's written
agreement which may be by mechanical or electronic transmission that it will abide by those
restrictions on access unless a statute, federal regulation, or interstate agreement otherwise governs
the sharing of the record or record series.
(5) A governmental entity may disclose a record to another state, the United States, or a foreign government
for the reasons listed in Subsections (1) and (2) without complying with the procedures of Subsection (2) or
(4) if disclosure is authorized by executive agreement, treaty, federal statute, compact, federal regulation,
or state statute.
(6)
{a) Subject to Subsections (6)(b) and (c), an entity receiving a record under this section is subject to the
same restrictions on disclosure of the record as the originating entity.
(b) A contractor or a private provider may receive information under this section only if:

{i)

the contractor or private provider's use of the record or record series produces a public benefit that
is greater than or equal to the individual privacy right that protects the record or record series;

(ii) the_ record or record series it requests:
(A) is necessary for the performance of a contract with a governmental entity;
(B) will only be used for the performance of the contract with the governmental entity;
(C) will not be disclosed to any other person; and
(D) will not be used for advertising or solicitation purposes; and

(iii) the contractor or private provider gives written assurance to the governmental entity that is
µruvic.Jiny the record ur record serie::; that it will adhere tu the restrictions of this Subsection (6)(b).
(c) The classification of a record already held by a governmental entity and the applicable restrictions on
disclosure of that record are not affected by the governmental entity's receipt under this section of a
record with a different classification that contains information that is also included in the previously held
record.
(7) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, if a more specific court rule or order, state statute,
federal statute, or federal regulation prohibits or requires sharing information, that rule, order, statute, or
federal regulation controls.
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(8) The following records may not be shared under this section:
(a) records held by the Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining that pertain to any person and that are gathered
under authority of Title 40, Chapter 6, Board and Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(b) records of publicly funded libraries as described in Subsection 63G-2-302(1 )(c); and
(c) a record described in Section 63G-12-210.

(9) Records that may evidence or relate to a violation of law may be disclosed to a government prosecutor,
peace officer, or auditor.

History
C. 1953, 63-2-206, enacted by L. 1991, ch. 259, § 17; 1992, ch. 228, § 2; 1992, ch. 280, § 23; 1997, ch. 234, § 3;
1999,ch.364,§ 13;2000,ch. 229, § 18;2001 (1stS.S.),ch. 8,§ 9;2002,ch.63,§ 1;2002,ch. 191, § 8;2006,
ch. 174, § 3; 2008, ch. 95, § 1; renumbered by L. 2008, ch. 382, § 1325; 2009, ch. 344, § 24; 2011, ch. 18, § 1;
2012,ch.377,§ 8.
Utah Code Annotated
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Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-305
Statutes current through the 2017 General Session

Utah Code Annotated > Title 63G General Government > Chapter 2 Government Records
Access and Management Act > Part 3 Classification

Notice
~ This section has more than one version with varying effective dates.
First of two versions of this section.

63G-2-305. Protected records. [Effective until July 1, 2017]
The following records are protected if properly classified by a governmental entity:
(1) trade secrets as defined in Section 13-24-2 if the person submitting the trade secret has provided the
governmental entity with the information specified in Section 63G-2-309;

(2) commercial information or non individual financial information obtained from a person if:
(a) disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to result in unfair competitive injury to
the person submillirig lhe information or would impair the ability of the governmental entity to
obtain necessary information in the future;
(b) the person submitting the information has a greater interest in prohibiting access than the public in
obtaining access; and

(c) the person submitting the information has provided the governmental entity with the information
specified in Section 63G-2-309;
(3) commercial or financial information acquired or prepared by a governmental entity to the extent that
disclosure would lead to financial speculations in currencies, securities, or commodities that will
interfere with a planned transaction by the governmental entity or cause substantial financial injury to
the governmental entity or state economy;
(4) records, the disclosure of which could cause commercial injury to, or confer a competitive advantage
upon a potential or actual competitor of, a commercial project entity as defined in Subsection 11-13103(4);

(5) test questions and ct11:swt:m:i Lu ue u:::;eu in fulurtt lic;ttri!:;e, cerlHicaliun, registration, employment, or
academic examinations;
(6) records, the disclosure of which would impair governmental procurement proceedings or give an unfair
advantage to any person proposing to enter into a contract or agreement with a governmental entity,
except, subject to Subsections (1) and (2), that this Subsection (6) does not restrict the right of a
person to have access to, after the contract or grant has been awarded and signed by all parties, a bid,
proposal, application, or other information submitted to or by a governmental entity in response to:
(a) an invitation for bids;
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(b) a request for proposals;
(c) a request for quotes;

(d) a grant; or
(e) other similar document;

(7) information submitted to or by a governmental entity in response to a request for information, except,
subject to Subsections (1) and (2), that this Subsection (7) does not restrict the right of a person to
have access to the information, after:
(a) a contract directly relating to the subject of the request for information has been awarded and
signed by all parties; or

(b)
(i)

a final determination is made not to enter into a contract that relates to the subject of the
request for information; and

(ii) at least two years have passed after the day on which the request for information is issued;
(8) records that would identify real property or the appraisal or estimated value of real or personal
property, including intellectual property, under consideration for public acquisition before any rights to
the property are acquired unless:

(a) public interest in obtaining access to the information is greater than or equal to the governmental
entity's need to acquire the property on the best terms possible;

{b) the information has already been disclosed to persons not employed by or under a duty of
confidentiality to the entity;
{c) in the case of records that would identify property, potential sellers of the described property have
already learned of the governmental entity's plans to acquire the property;

(d) in the case of records that would identify the appraisal or estimated value of property, the potential
sellers have already learned of the governmental entity's estimated value of the property; or
(e) the property under consideration for public acquisition is a single family residence and the
governmental entity seeking to acquire the property has initiated negotiations to acquire the
property as required under Section 788-6-505;
(9) records prepared in contemplation of sale, exchange, lease, rental, or other compensated transaction
of real or personal property including intellectual property, which, if disclosed prior to completion of the
transaction, would reveal the appraisal or estimated value of the subject property, unless:
(a) the public interest in access is greater than or equal to the interests in restricting access, including
the governmental entity's interest in maximizing the financial benefit of the transaction; or

(b) when prepared by or on behalf of a governmental entity, appraisals or estimates of the value of the
subject property have already been disclosed to persons not employed by or under a duty of
confidentiality to the entity;
(10) records created or maintained for civil, criminal, or administrative enforcement purposes or audit
purposes, or for discipline, licensing, certification, or registration purposes, if release of the records:

(a) reasonably could be expected to interfere with investigations undertaken for enforcement,
discipline, licensin~, certification, or registration purposes;

{b) reasonably could be expected to interfere with audits, disciplinary, or enforcement proceedings;
{c) would create a danger of depriving a person of a right to a fair trial or impartial hearing;
(d) reasonably could be expected to disclose the identity of a source who is not generally known
outside of government and, in the case of a record compiled in the course of an investigation,
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disclose information furnished by a source not genera!!y known outside of government if disclosure
would compromise the source; or
(e) reasonably could be expected to disclose investigative or audit techniques, procedures, policies, or
orders not generally known outside of government if disclosure would interfere with enforcement or
audit efforts;
(11) records the disclosure of which would jeopardize the life or safety of an individual;
(12) records the disclosure of which would jeopardize the security of governmental property, governmental
programs, or governmental recordkeeping systems from damage, theft, or other appropriation or use
contrary to law or public policy;

~

(13) records that, if disclosed, would jeopardize the security or safety of a correctional facility, or records
relating to incarceration, treatment, probation, or parole, that would interfere with the control and
supervision of an offender's incarceration, treatment, probation, or parole;

(14) records that, if disclosed, would reveal recommendations made to the Board of Pardons and Parole by
an employee of or contractor for the Department of Corrections, the Board of Pardons and Parole, or
the Department of Human Services that are based on the employee's or contractor's supervision,
diagnosis, or treatment of any person within the board's jurisdiction;
(15) records and audit workpapers that identify audit, collection, and operational procedures and methods
used by the State Tax Commission, if disclosure would interfere with audits or collections;
(16) records of a governmental audit agency relating to an ongoing or planned audit until the final audit is
released;
(17) records that are subject to the attorney client privilege;
(18) records prepared for or by an attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, employee, or agent of a
governmental entity ~or, or in anticipation of, litigation or a judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
proceeding;
(19)
(a)

(i)

personal files of a state legislator, including personal correspondence to or from a member of
the Legislature; and

(ii) notwithstanding Subsection (19)(a)(i), correspondence that gives notice of legislative action or
policy may not be classified as protected under this section; and
(b)

(i)

an internal communication that is part of the deliberative process in connection with the
preparation of legislation between:

(A) members of a legislative body;
(B) a member of a legislative body and a member of the legislative body's staff; or
(C) members of a legislative body's staff; and

(ii) notwithstanding Subsection (19)(b){i), a communication that gives notice of legislative action or
policy may not be classified as protected under this section;
(20)

(a) records in the custody or control of the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, that, if
disclosed, would reveal a particular legislator's contemplated legislation or contemplated course of
action before the legislator has elected to support the legislation or course of action, or made the
legislation or course of action public; and
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(b) notwithstanding Subsection (20)(a), the form to request legislation submitted to the Office of
Legislative Research and General Counsel is a public document unless a legislator asks that the
records requesting the legislation be maintained as protected records until such time as the
legislator elects to make the legislation or course of action public;
(21) research requests from legislators to the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel or the
Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst and research findings prepared in response to these requests;
(22) drafts, unless otherwise classified as public;
(23) records concerning a governmental entity's strategy about:
(a) collective bargaining; or
(b) imminent or pending litigation;

(24) records of investigations of loss occurrences and analyses of loss occurrences that may be covered by
the Risk Management Fund, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, the Uninsured Employers' Fund, or
similar divisions in other governmental entities;
(25) records, other than personnel evaluations, that contain a personal recommendation concerning an
individual if disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, or
disclosure is not in the public interest;
(26) records that reveal the location of historic, prehistoric, paleontological, or biological resources that if
known would jeopardize the security of those resources or of valuable historic, scientific, educational,
or cultural information;
{27) records of independent state agencies if the disclosure of the records would conflict with the fiduciary
obligations of the agency;
(28) records of an institution within the state system of higher education defined in Section 538-1-102
regarding tenure evaluations, appointments, applications for admissions, retention decisions, and
promotions, which could be properly discussed in a meeting closed in accordance with Title 52,
Chapter 4, Open and Public Meetings Act, provided that records of the final decisions about tenure,
appointments, retention, promotions, or those students admitted, may not be classified as protected
under this section;

(29) records of the governor's office, including budget recommendations, legislative proposals, and policy
statements, that if disclosed would reveal the governor's contemplated policies or contemplated
courses of action before the governor has implemented or rejected those policies or courses of action
or made them public;
(30) records of the Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst relating to budget analysis, revenue estimates,
and fiscal notes of proposed legislation before issuance of the final recommendations in these areas;

(31) records provided by the United States or by a government entity outside the state that are given to the
governmental entity with a requirement that they be managed as protected records if the providing
entity certifies that the record would not be subject to public disclosure if retained by it;
(32) transcripts, minutes, or reports of the closed portion of a meeting of a public body except as provided in
Section 52-4-206;
(33) records that would reveal the contents of settlement negotiations but not including final settlements or
empirical data to the extent that they are not otherwise exempt from disclosure;
(34) memoranda prepared by staff and used in the decision-making process by an administrative law judge,
a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole, or a member of any other body charged by law with
performing a quasi-judicial function;

(35) records that would reveal negotiations regarding assistance or incentives offered by or requested from
a governmental entity for the purpose of encouraging a person to expand or locate a business in Utah,
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but only if disclosUie would iesult in actual economic haim to the person m place the governmental
entity at a competitive disadvantage, but this section may not be used to restrict access to a record
evidencing a final contract;
(36) materials to which access must be limited for purposes of securing or maintaining the governmental
entity's proprietary protection of intellectual property rights including patents, copyrights, and trade
secrets;
(37) the name of a donor or a prospective donor to a governmental entity, including an institution within the
state system of higher education defined in Section 538-1-102, and other information concerning the
donation that could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of the donor, provided that:

(a) the donor requests anonymity in writing;

(b) any terms, conditions, restrictions, or privileges relating to the donation may not be classified
protected by the governmental entity under this Subsection (37); and
(c) except for an institution within the state system of higher education defined in Section 538-1-102,
the governmental unit to which the donation is made is primarily engaged in educational,
charitable, or artistic endeavors, and has no regulatory or legislative authority over the donor, a
member of the donor's immediate family, or any entity owned or controlled by the donor or the
donor's immediate family;
(38) accident reports, except as provided in Sections 41 -6a-404, 41-12a-202, and 73-18-13;
(39) a notification of workers' compensation insurance coverage described in Section 34A-2-205;
(40)

(a) the following records of an institution within the state system of higher education defined in Section
538-1-102, which have been developed, discovered, disclosed to, or received by or on behalf of
faculty, staff, employees, or students of the institution:

(i)

unpublished lecture notes;

(ii) unpublished notes, data, and information:

{A) relating to research; and
(B) of:
(I)

the institution within the state system of higher education defined in Section 538-1102; or

(II) a sponsor of sponsored research;

(iii) unpublished manuscripts;

(iv) creative works in process;
(v) scholarly correspondence; and
(vi) confidential information contained in research proposals;
(b) Subsection (40)(a) may not be construed to prohibit disclosure of public information required
pursuant to Subsection 538-16-302(2)(a) or (b); and

(c) Subsection (40)(a) may not be construed to affect the ownership of a record;
(41)

(a) records in the custody or control of the Office of Legislative Auditor General that would reveal the
name of a particular legislator who requests a legislative audit prior to the date that audit is
completed and made public; and
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(b) notwithstanding Subsection (41 )(a), a request for a legislative audit submitted to the Office of the
Legislative Auditor General is a public document unless the legislator asks that the records in the
custody or control of the Office of Legislative Auditor General that would reveal the name of a
particular legislator who requests a legislative audit be maintained as protected records until the
audit is completed and made public;
(42) records that provide detail as to the location of an explosive, including a map or other document that
indicates the location of:
(a) a production facility; or
(b) a magazine;

(43) information:
(a) contained in the statewide database of the Division of Aging and Adult Services created by Section
62A-3-311.1; or

(b) received or maintained in relation to the Identity Theft Reporting Information System (IRIS)
established under Section 67-5-22;
(44) information contained in the Management Information System and Licensing Information System
described in Title 62A, Chapter 4a, Child and Family Services;

(45) information regarding National Guard operations or activities in support of the National Guard's federal
mission;
(46) records provided by any pawn or secondhand business to a law enforcement agency or to the central
database in compliance with Title 13, Chapter 32a, Pawnshop and Secondhand Merchandise
Transaction Information Act;
(47) information regarding food security, risk, and vulnerability assessments performed by the Department
of Agriculture and Food;

(48) except to the extent that the record is exempt from this chapter pursuant to Section 63G-2-106, records
related to an emergency plan or program, a copy of which is provided to or prepared or maintained by
the Division of Emergency Management, and the disclosure of which would jeopardize:
(a) the safety of the general public; or
(b) the security of:

(i)

governmental property;

(ii) governmental programs; or

(iii) the property of a private person who provides the Division of Emergency Management
information;
(49) records of the Department of Agriculture and Food that provides for the identification, tracing, or control
of livestock diseases, including any program established under Title 4, Chapter 24, Utah Livestock
Brand and Anti-Theft Act or Title 4, Chapter 31, Control of Animal Disease;
(50) as provided in Section 26-39-501 :

(a) information or records held by the Department of Health related to a complaint regarding a child
care program or residential child care which the department is unable to substantiate; and
(b) information or records related to a complaint received by the Department of Health from an
anonymous complainant regarding a child care program or residential child care;

(51) unless otherwise classified as public under Section 63G-2-301 and except as provided under Section
41-1a-116, an individual's home address, home telephone number, or personal mobile phone number,
if:
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(a} the individual is required to pmvide the information in order to comp;y with a law, ordinance, rule,
or order of a government entity; and
(b) the subject of the record has a reasonable expectation that this information will be kept confidential
due to:

(i)

the nature of the law, ordinance, rule, or order; and

(ii) the individual complying with the law, ordinance, rule, or order;
(52) the name, home address, work addresses, and telephone numbers of an individual that is engaged in,

or that provides goods or services for, medical or scientific research that is:
(a) conducted within the state system of higher education, as defined in Section 538-1-102; and
(b) conducted using animals;
(53) an initial proposal under Title 63N, Chapter 13, Part 2, Government Procurement Private Proposal

Program, to the extent not made public by rules made under that chapter;
{54) in accordance with Section 78A-12-203, any record of the Judicial Performance Evaluation
Commission concerning an individual commissioner's vote on whether or not to recommend that the
voters retain a judge including information disclosed under Subsection 78A-12-203(5)(e);
(55) information collected and a report prepared by the Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission

concerning a judge, unless Section 20A-7-702 or Title 78A, Chapter 12, Judicial Performance
Evaluation Commission Act, requires disclosure of, or makes public, the information or report;
(56) records contained in the Management Information System created in Section 62A-4a-1003;
(57) records provided or received by the Public Lands Policy Coordinating Office in furtherance of any

contract or other agreement made in accordance with Section 63J-4-603;
(58) information requested by and provided to the 911 Division under Section 63H-7a-302;

(59) in accordance with Section 73-10-33:
(a) a management plan for a water conveyance facility in the possession of the Division of Water

Resources or the Board of Water Resources; or

(b) an outline of an emergency response plan in possession of the state or a county or municipality;
(60) the following records in the custody or control of the Office of Inspector General of Medicaid Services,
created in Section 63A-13-201:
(a) records that would disclose information relating to allegations of personal misconduct, gross
mismanagement, or illegal activity of a person if the information or allegation cannot be
corroborated by the Office of Inspector General of Medicaid Services through other documents or
evidence, and the records relating to the allegation are not relied upon by the Office of Inspector
General of Medicaid Services in preparing a final investigation report or final audit report;
(b) records and audit workpapers to the extent they would disclose the identity of a person who, during
the course of an investigation or audit, communicated the existence of any Medicaid fraud, waste,
or abuse, or a violation or suspected violation of a law, rule, or regulation adopted under the laws
of this state, a political subdivision of the state, or any recognized entity of the United States, if the
information was disclosed on the condition that the identity of the person be protected;
(c) before the time that an investigation or audit is completed and the final investigation or final audit
report is released, records or drafts circulated to a person who is not an employee or head of a
governmental entity for the person's response or information;
(d) records that would disclose an outline or part of any investigation, audit survey plan, or audit
program; or
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(e) requests for an investigation or audit, if disclosure would risk circumvention of an investigation or
audit;
(61) records that reveal methods used by the Office of Inspector General of Medicaid Services, the fraud
unit, or the Department of Health, to discover Medicaid fraud, waste, or abuse;

(62) information provided to the Department of Health or the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing under Subsection 58-68-304(3) or (4);
(63) a record described in Section 63G-12-21 O;
(64) captured plate data that is obtained through an automatic license plate reader system used by a
governmental entity as authorized in Section 41-6a-2003;
(65) any record in the custody of the Utah Office for Victims of Crime relating to a victim, including:
(a) a victim's application or request for benefits;

(b) a victim's receipt or denial of benefits; and
(c) any administrative notes or records made or created for the purpose of, or used to, evaluate or
communicate a victim's eligibility for or denial of benefits from the Crime Victim Reparations Fund;
and
(66) an audio or video recording created by a body-worn camera, as that term is defined in Section 77-7a103, that records sound or images inside a hospital or health care facility as those terms are defined in
Section 78B-3-403, inside a clinic of a health care provider, as that term is defined in Section 78B-3403, or inside a human service program as that term is defined in Subsection 62A-2-101 (19)(a)(vi),
except for recordings that:
(a) depict the commission of an alleged crime;
{b) record any encounter between a law enforcement officer and a person that results in death or
bodily injury, or includes an instance when an officer fires a weapon;

(c) record any encounter that is the subject of a complaint or a legal proceeding against a law
enforcement officer or law enforcement agency;

(d) contain an officer involved critical incident as defined in Subsection 76-2-408(1 )(d); or
(e) have been requested for reclassification as a public record by a subject or authorized agent of a
subject featured in the recording.

History
C. 1953, 63-2-304, enacted by L. 1991, ch. 259, § 21; 1992, ch. 228, § 3; 1992, ch. 280, § 28; 1994, ch. 13, § 5;
1994,ch. 114,§ 1;1995,ch. 133,§ 2;1996,ch. 79,§ 81;1997,ch.234,§ 4;2000,ch.232,§ 2;2000,ch.335,
§ 4;2002,ch. 78,§ 2;2002,ch.86,§ 1;2002,ch. 108,§ 22;2002,ch.283,§ 15;2002,ch.286,§ 56;2003,ch.
60,§ 1;2003,ch. 131,§ 53;2004,ch.223,§ 8;2004,ch.299,§ 15;2004,ch.358,§ 15;2005,ch.2,§ 278;
2005,ch. 131,§ 1;2005,ch.201,§ 6;2005,ch.214,§ 4;2005,ch.256,§ 12;2005,ch.297,§ 2;2006,ch. 14,
§ 48;2006,ch. 174,§ 4;2006,ch.261,§ 2;2007,ch.66,§ 8;2007,ch.352,§ 14;2008,ch.3,§ 199;2008,ch.
87,§ 4;2008,ch.95,§ 2;2008,ch. 101,§ 1;2008,ch. 111,§ 12;2008,ch. 161,§ 1;2008,ch. 196,§ 8;2008,
ch. 248, § 2; 2008, ch. 352, § 1; renumbered by L. 2008, ch. 382, § 1331; 2009, ch. 64, § 3; 2009, ch. 121, § 5;
2010,ch.6,§ 23;2010,ch. 113,§ 1;2010,ch.247,§ 1;2011,ch. 18,§ 2;2011,ch.46,§ 15;2011,ch.55,§
15;2011,ch.80,§ 1;2011,ch. 151,§ 4;2011,ch. 161,§ 7;2012,ch.331,§ 28;2012,ch.377,§ 10;2013,ch.
12,§ 19;2013,ch.445,§ 16;2013,ch.447,§ 7;L.2014,ch.90,§2;L.2014,ch.320,§5;L.2015,ch. 147,§1;
L. 2015, ch. 283, § 39; L. 2015, ch. 411, § 5; L. 2017, ch. 415, § 1; L. 2017, S8193, § 1.
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Copyright© 2017 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 9 of 9
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-305

End of Document

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Code Ann.§ 41-1a-116
Statutes current through the 2017 General Session

Utah Code Annotated> Title 41 Motor Vehicles > Chapter 1a Motor Vehicle Act> Part 1
Administration

41-1a-116. Records - Access to records - Fees.
(1)
(a) All motor vehicle title and registration records of the division are protected unless the division
determines based upon a written request by the subject of the record that the record is public.
(b) In addition to the provisions of this section, access to all division records is permitted for all purposes
described in the federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. Chapter 123.

(2)
(a) Access to public records is determined by Section 63G-2-201.
(b) A record designated as public under Subsection (1 )(a) may be used for advertising or solicitation
purposes.
(3) Access to protected records, except as provided in Subsection (4), is determined by Section 63G-2-202.

(4)
(a) In addition to those persons granted access to protected records under Section 63G-2-202, the division
shall disclose a protected record to a licensed private investigator, holding a valid agency or registrant
license, with a legitimate business need, a person with a bona fide security interest, or the owner of a
mobile home park subject to Subsection (5), only upon receipt of a signed acknowledgment that the
person receiving that protected record may not:
(i)

resell or disclose information from that record to any other person except as permitted in the
federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994; or

(ii) use information from that record for advertising or solicitation purposes.

(b) A legitimate business need under Subsection (4)(a) does not include the collection of a debt.

(5) The division may disclose the name or address, or both, of the lienholder or mobile home owner of record,
or both of them, to the owner of a mobile home park, if all of the following conditions are met:
(a) a mobile home located within the mobile home park owner's park has been abandoned under Section
57-16-13 or the resident is in default under the resident's lease;

(b) the mobile home park owner has conducted a reasonable search, but is unable to determine the name
or address, or both, of the lienholder or mobile home owner of record; and
(c) the mobile home park owner has submitted a written statement to the division explaining the mobile
home park owner's efforts to determine the name or address, or both, of the lienholder or mobile home
owner of record before the mobile home park owner contacted the division.
(6) The division may provide protected information to a statistic gathering entity under Subsection (4) only in
summary form.
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(7) A person allowed access to protected records under Subsection (4) may request motor vehicle tit!e or
registration information from the division regarding any person, entity, or motor vehicle by submitting a
written application on a form provided by the division.
(8) If a person regularly requests information for business purposes, the division may by rule allow the
information requests to be made by telephone and fees as required under Subsection (9) charged to a
division billing account to facilitate division service. The rules shall require that the:
(a) division determine if the nature of the business and the volume of requests merit the dissemination of
the information by telephone;

(b) division determine if the credit rating of the requesting party justifies providing a billing account; and
(c) requester submit to the division an application that includes names and signatures of persons
authorized to request information by telephone and charge the fees to the billing account.

(9)
(a) The division shall charge a reasonable search fee determined under Section 63J-1-504 for the
research of each record requested.

(b} Fees may not be charged for furnishing information to persons necessary for their compliance with this
chapter.
(c) Law enforcement agencies have access to division records free of charge.
(10)
(a) It is a class B misdemeanor for a person to knowingly or intentionally access, use, disclose, or
disseminate a record created or maintained by the division or any information contained in a record
created or maintained by the division for a purpose prohibited or not permitted by statute, rule,
regulation, or policy of a governmental entity.

(b) A person who discovers or becomes aware of any unauthorized use of records created or maintained
by the division shall inform the director of the unauthorized use.

History
L. 1935, ch. 45, § 9; C. 1943, 57-3a-9; L. 1963, ch. 66, § 2; 1979, ch. 150, § 2; 1984 (2nd S.S.), ch. 15, § 50;
1989, ch. 33, § 1; C. 1953, 41-1-9; renumbered by L. 1992, ch. 1, § 21; 1992, ch. 232, § 1; 1993, ch. 221, § 3;
1994,ch.313,§ 27;1995,ch.314,§ 1;2000,ch.86,§ 31;2000,ch.255,§ 1;2001,ch.256,§ 1;2003,ch.56,
§ 1;2004,ch.332,§ 1;2008,ch.382,§ 537;2009,ch. 183,§ 86;2011,ch.243,§ 1.
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